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RECENT LEGISLATION
Recent Legislation
AIRCRAFT LAW OF ILLINOIS-COMPARISON WITH UNIFORM STATE LAW.-
The evolution of the airplane from an inherently dangerous instrumentality
to a common means of transportation has opened a new field of law,
created new problems, and made necessary new legislation. In August,
1922, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
approved of the present Uniform State Law for Aeronautics, and it has
since been adopted, with slight variations, in more than one-fourth of the
states and in Hawaii. In the face of the growing sentiment in favor of
this law, Illinois has adopted one of a radically different design. Laws
1928, 85, amended by Laws 1929, 172. A comparison of the two is submit-
ted to show their relative values.
Sec. 2 of the Uniform State Law provides that sovereignty in the space
above the state rests in the state. The new Illinois statute contains no
provision covering this point. Since the proposition is not likely to be
doubted, the pronouncement in the Uniform Act can hardly make much
difference, and the Missouri enactment of the Uniform State Law has
completely omitted this provision. Laws 1929, 122. Sec. 3 of the Uniform
Law provides that the ownership of the space above the lands and waters
of the state is vested in the owners of the surface beneath, subject to a
right of flight. The Illinois statute makes no pronouncement to this ef-
fect. But the Uniform Law does not attempt to give the landowner rights
which he did not have before; its purpose was rather to deprive him of
some. Legislative pronouncement cannot destroy title. If the right of
flight does not exist without statutory enactment, there is great doubt
whether it will exist with such enactment. Logan, AmcRAF" LAW-MADE
PLAIN (1928) 19-21. Therefore this provision of the Uniform State Law
for Aeronautics is of little value. Likewise, the provision that landings
made upon private property without the owner's consent are unlawful
unless required by necessity causes no material change in the existing
law, and might well have been omitted. This also applies to the sections
declaring that crimes and torts committed and contracts made over the
state shall be determined by the laws of the state, for it is well settled
that the admiralty law will not apply. The Crawford Bros. No. 2 (D. C.
W. D. Wash. 1914), 215 F. 269; In re Reinhardt (1921), 232 N. Y. 115, 133
N. E. 371.
The one important matter for which the Uniform State Law provides
and the Illinois statute makes no provision is that of liability for injuries
caused by airplanes to persons and property beneath. The Uniform Law
provides absolute liability except in cases where the injured party has
been contributorily negligent. This is in accord with the British Air
Navigation Act of 1920. Under the Illinois law it would be up to the
courts to decide whether the ordinary principles of negligence should ap-
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ply, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur followed, or airplanes considered dan-
gerous instrumentalities and the owners thereof subject to absolute lia-
bility. Many authorities favor the imposition of absolute liability. Hazel-
tine, THE LAW OF THE Am (1911) 86; Logan, op. cit. 48-50. But a number
of writers agree that since airplanes should no longer be considered immi-
nently dangerous instrumentalities, the application of the doctrine of ,es
ipsa loquitur is the better policy. Note (1923) 57 AMER. L. REv. 97; 6 ILL.
L. QUARTERLY 71; 12 LAW NoTEs 108. For a good discussion Of the prob-
lem see Zollman, THE LAw OF THE Am (1927) 68.
Flight is declared by the Uniform Law to be lawful unless at such a low
altitude as to interfere with the then existing use of the surface, or unless
it is so conducted as to be imminently dangerous to persons or property
lawfully on the surface beneath. However excellent this may appear as a
theoretical legal principle, it is apparent that the determination of the
ininum legal altitude in each case would present a difficult problem. The
Illinois statute has avoided this in a sensible manner by adopting the
Federal regulations in the Air Commerce Regulations of 1928 which per-
tain to the height of flight. They provide that no flight shall be made
over congested parts of cities and towns except at a height sufficient to
permit a reasonable safe emergency landing, which. in no case shall be
less than 1,000 feet, and no flight shall be made elsewhere at a height less
than 500 feet, except where indispensable to an industrial flying opera-
tion. The Federal regulations prohibiting acrobatic flying over cities, as-
semblies, airports, with passengers at any height, and otherwise at a height
under 1,500 feet are also followed. It is suggested that the results under
this rule will be far more satisfactory than under a provision prohibiting
flight "imminently dangerous to persons or property lawfully on the land
or water beneath."
But the Illinois statute goes a step farther than the Uniform State Law
for Aeronautics in requiring that all persons operating aircraft within
the state have a license issued by the authority of the Secretary of Com-
merce of the United States applicable to the type of flying they do. This
is by far the most valuable provision of the statute because it subjects all
pilots to the Department of Commerce rules of aeronautics, for breach of
which their licenses will be revoked. It must be understood that at least
part of the Federal regulations are now in effect in all states, without any
enactment by the states. Congress has the power to regulate intrastate
commerce where such regulation is necessary to prevent interference with
interstate commerce. Such regulation is not an invasion of the states'
rights. Buck v. Kuykendall (1924), 267 U. S. 307; State of New York v.
United States (1921), 257 U. S. 591. Therefore all regulations which
must be complied with by planes in intrastate flying to prevent interference
with interstate commerce are already in force all over the country. These
include rules as to taking off, landing, lighting for night flying, conduct of
planes passing in the air and probably a number of others; but it is doubt-
ful whether a large number of the regulations of the Department of Coin-
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merce fall within this rule. By requiring that all pilots in the state have
Federal licenses, the problem is solved.
Other states have from time to time enacted statutes somewhat similar
to the new Illinois statute, but Illinois is unique in having so whole-heartedly
given the control of aircraft to the Federal government. If a few other
states followed its example we should have two entirely distinct movements
toward unity in air law, one championed by the Uniform State Law, urg-
ing that the states of this country should assert their individual powers
over aeronautics in one voice, and the other initiated by the Illinois statute,
favoring the enactment of only those statutes which subject all flying to
the same rules which govern interstate flight. J. A. G., '31.
BANKS-TRusTEE FOR PROCEEDS OF ITEMS SENT FOR COLLECTION.-It is
provided in a recent Missouri statute that "when a drawee or payor bank
has presented to it for payment an item or items drawn upon or payable
by or at such bank and at the time -has on deposit to the credit of the
maker or drawer an amount equal to such item or items and such drawee
or payor shall fail or close for business as above, after having charged
such item or items to the account of the maker or drawee thereof or other-
wise discharged his liability thereupon, but without such item or items
having been paid or settled for by the drawee or payor either in money or
by an unconditional credit given on its books or on the books of any other
bank which has been requested or accepted so as to constitute such drawee
or payor or other bank debtor therefor, the assets of such drawee or payor
shall be impressed with a trust in favor of the owner or owners of such
item or items for the amount thereof or for the balance payable upon a
number of items which have been exchanged, and such owner or owners
shall be entitled to a preferred claim upon such assets, irrespective of
whether the fund representing such item or items can be traced and identi-
fied as part of such assets or has been intermingled with or converted into
other assets of such failed bank." It continues by providing for such a
preference in the assets of a bank other than the drawee or payor which
shall fail after collecting items sent to it for that purpose, but before actual
payment by it to the owner of such items. Mo. Laws 1929, 208, sec. 11.
Since the decision of First National Bank of Lapeer v. Sanford (1895),
62 Mo. A. 394, the courts of this state have applied substantially the rule
expressed above. "The Missouri doctrine thus appears to be that in the
absence of intention to the contrary, as designated by a reciprocal ac-
counts arrangement to send paper for collection and remittance creates
the relationship of principal and agent which is not changed by an act of
the agent in contravention of his authority by the method of collection,
credit, attempted remittance or by mixing the proceeds with general assets,
provided that funds sufficient to constitute a res exist in the insolvent bank
or solvent correspondent banks at the time of the charge and of insolvency."
Note (1929) 14 ST. LouIs L. REV. 406. This view is opposed to that an-
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